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In today’s marketplace, the way that corporations conduct business is
drastically changing, and lawyers are increasingly relying on third-party
consultants, such as accountants or investment bankers, to facilitate them in
providing accurate legal advice to corporate clients. Despite this reliance,
whether the attorney–client privilege protects the communications between an
attorney and a third-party consultant is often questioned. In United States v.
Kovel, the Second Circuit found that the attorney–client privilege extended to
communications between an attorney and a third-party consultant who acted
as an interpreter. However, both federal and state courts have since split over
the proper scope of the Kovel doctrine. In particular, courts have applied both
a narrow and broad interpretation of the Kovel doctrine, rendering the
application of the doctrine unpredictable.
Wisconsin in particular has not yet addressed whether the attorney–client
privilege should apply to third-party consultants, and if so, what the proper
scope of or limitations to the privilege should be. Based upon an analysis of
both federal and state courts’ application of the attorney–client privilege as
well as Wisconsin’s own statutes and policies, this Comment recommends that
Wisconsin follow other states and adopt the Kovel doctrine. Rather than apply
a broad application, Wisconsin should adopt a narrow, but lenient, approach
to the Kovel doctrine. Specifically, Wisconsin courts should analyze (1)
whether there is sufficient evidence, other than the substance of the
communications, to determine that the consultant was hired for the facilitation
of legal advice and (2) whether the third-party consultant acts as a translator
of client only information.
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1. See generally Robert Eli Rosen, “We’re All Consultants Now”: How Change in Client
Organizational Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal Services, 44
ARIZ. L. REV. 637 (2002) (arguing that changes in businesses have affected how legal services are
rendered to corporations).
2. Id. at 641 50.
3. Edward J. Imwinkelried & Andrew Amoroso, The Application of the Attorney–Client
Privilege to Interactions Among Clients, Attorneys, and Experts in the Age of Consultants: The Need
for A More Precise, Fundamental Analysis, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 265, 272 (2011) [hereinafter
Imwinkelried]; Rosen, supra
Having downsized, outsourcing recommends that
companies use non-employee workers on a project basis. Today,
organizational functions
(footnote omitted) (quoting Walter W.
Powell, The Capitalist Firm in the Twenty-First Century: Emerging Patterns in Western Enterprise, in
THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 33, 64 (Paul DiMaggio ed., 2001)); see also Denise Horan, Why Use a Consultant for
Your Business?, DENISE HORAN: SALE AND MGMT. STRATEGY, CONSULTING, & TRAINING (Mar. 12,
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The way that corporations conduct their businesses and manage the global
marketplace is drastically changing.1 Due to the complexity and legal demands
of the marketplace, organizations are increasingly downsizing, restructuring,
and relying more on third-party consultants to competitively perform in the
marketplace.2 Rather than have an employee perform a service, corporations
utilize third-party consultants who function as independent contractors to
perform the once traditional employee services.3
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legal risks are rarely isolated matters.
Instead, these legal risks affect other corporate or business decisions.4 Because
of the effect that
have utilized a variety of consultants from a range of fields to help them make
informed business decisions.5 For example, attorneys have utilized the
expertise and knowledge of third-party accountants,6 public relation
consultants,7 investment bankers,8 and actuarial consultants9 to provide legal
advice. These professional consultants often possess information and expertise
that is necessary for lawyers to accurately give legal advice to clients regarding
the consequences or risks of a business decision.10
However, when attorneys consult with third-party consultants, there is often
a question as to whether the communications are protected by the attorney
client privilege.
Traditionally, the attorney client privilege protected
communications between an attorney and client that were made in confidence
for the purpose of seeking legal advice.11 In Upjohn Co. v. United States,12 the
Supreme Court held that the attorney client privilege applied to corporations
and delineated that the purpose of the attorney client privilege is to provide
13

Because the business landscape is changing with the increasing use of thirdparty consultants, understanding when, if at all, attorney client privilege

01/29/2019 13:38:24
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2018),
http://www.denisehoran.com/news-articles/Why-Use-a-Consultant-for-Your-Business--74news.htm [https://perma.cc/LB62-9596].
4. Rosen, supra note 1, at 659 ( Legal risks not only must be assessed, but also processed because
legal risks often are not detached risks.
5. Michele DeStefano Beardslee, The Corporate Attorney–Client Privilege: Third-Rate Doctrine
for Third-Party Consultants, 62 SMU L. REV. 727, 736 (2009) (
litigious, publicized, and complex marketplace, corporations often rely on consultants from various
disciplines to help make business and legal decisions.
6. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 919 (2d Cir. 1961).
7. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 322, 324
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
8. See United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 138 (2d Cir. 1999).
9. See Cottillion v. United Ref. Co., 279 F.R.D. 290, 299 (W.D. Pa. 2011).
10. See Beardslee, supra note 5, at 737 39 (explaining how an interview Beardslee conducted
with a general counsel revealed the extent that attorneys may need the advice and expertise of PR
consultants to provide efficient legal advice).
11. See, e.g.,
ing, 218 F.R.D. 125, 133 (E.D. Tex.
2003).
12. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
13. Id. at 389 95.
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14. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
15. Id. at 920 23.
16. Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 284 ( If an attorney client expert interaction does not fall
within the parameters of the [Kovel doctrine], the courts split badly over the question of whether the
legal privilege should apply to the communications involved in the interactions.
17. Kim J. Gruetzmacher, Privileged Communications with Accountants: The Demise of United
States v. Kovel, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 977
Over the past four decades, courts have
repeatedly narrowed the holding in Kovel
see also infra Section III.B and accompanying notes.
18. See infra Section III.C and accompanying notes.
19. See infra Sections III.B, III.C and accompanying notes.
20. See infra Section IV.A and accompanying notes.
21. See infra Section IV.A and accompanying notes.
22. See WIS. STAT. § 905.01 (2015 2016).
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attorneys alike.
In the landmark case, United States v. Kovel,14 the Second Circuit applied
the attorney client privilege to communications between an attorney and
accountant where the accountant assisted the attorney in understanding the
15
However,
since Kovel was decided, courts have split regarding the proper scope of the
Kovel doctrine.16 Some federal courts have narrowed Kovel
the application of the attorney client privilege when applied to third-party
consultants.17 A few other courts have applied the Kovel doctrine broadly.18
While the Kovel doctrine has been applied in multiple federal circuits, there is
no singular consensus on the proper scope of or limitations to the privilege,
rendering the application of the doctrine unpredictable.19
Furthermore, state courts have also adopted the Kovel doctrine and have
applied it in their jurisdictions.20 Similar to the federal courts, these states have
yet to adopt a uniform consensus as to how broadly or narrowly the Kovel
doctrine should be applied. 21 While many states have adopted or considered
the Kovel doctrine, Wisconsin has yet to confront a case involving the doctrine.
client privilege is contained in a statute rather
than the common law, the codified attorney client privilege evidentiary rule
does not explicitly address whether communications between attorneys and
third-party consultants are covered by the privilege.22 This Comment will
examine whether Wisconsin should adopt the Kovel doctrine as defined by
other courts, and if so, whether the scope of the privilege should be limiting or
broad.
attorney client privilege, this Comment recommends that Wisconsin follow
other states and adopt the Kovel doctrine. Rather than apply a broad application
of the test, Wisconsin should adopt a narrow, but lenient, approach to the Kovel
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doctrine: one that is not so broad that the privilege applies to every situation but
neither too narrow that the privilege is severely limited and inapplicable. This
client privilege doctrine.
Part II of this Comment discusses the history of the attorney client
privilege, when the privilege is applicable, and the policy considerations
underlying the privilege. Part III analyzes the Kovel doctrine and examines the
federal court cases that have followed Kovel. This section highlights how some
federal courts have narrowed Kovel
have been less rigid with the doctrine. Part IV explores how states have
interpreted the Kovel
attorney client privilege before recommending that Wisconsin adopt a
moderate but narrow approach to the Kovel doctrine.
II. BACKGROUND ON ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. History of Attorney–Client Privilege
The attorney client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential
communications 23 and can be traced back to the 1600s during the Reign of
Queen Elizabeth I.24 During the Elizabethan era, the holder of the privilege was
understanding.25 During this time, the purpose of the privilege was to prevent
an attorney from testifying against his client, an act that would be dishonorable

01/29/2019 13:38:24
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23. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290, at 542 (John T.
McNaughton ed., 1961); United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989).
24. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2290, at 542; Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 267. However,
some commentators have also traced the origins of the attorney client privilege to Roman law rather
than during the reign of Queen Elizabeth I. See Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential
Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487 (1928). Under this theory, the
attorney
honor. Id.
a servant who was . . . a slave
slave was an essential part of the family. Id. at 487 88. This was b
loyalty. Id.
Id. at 487.
25. See John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney–Client
Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 445 (1982); WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2290, at 545.

40986 mqt_102-2 Sheet No. 155 Side B

01/29/2019 13:38:24

LOPEZ - MULR VOL. 102, NO. 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

610

1/29/2019 10:15 AM

[102:605

to a gentleman.26 Under this philosophy, a true gentleman would never disclose
.27
However, near the end of the eighteenth century, courts no longer used the
attorney client privilege,28 and it was not until the early nineteenth century that
the privilege reemerged under a new policy theory.29 Rather than protect a
theory underlying the adoption of the attorney client privilege was based on
utilitarian principles.30 In particular, in the American jurisprudence, attorney
client privilege was based on the proposition that but for the protection of a
necessary information, irrevocably harming the facilitation of legal advice.31
fidential information
is vital to the attorney client relationship and enables the attorney to give
competent legal advice.32 Today, Federal Rules of Evidence 501 codifies the
attorney client privilege.33 It states that a claim of privilege is governed by the
as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and
34

01/29/2019 13:38:24

32. Jones, supra note 26, at 424.
33. FED. R. EVID. 501.
34. Id.
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26. Ann M. Murphy, Spin Control and the High-Profile Client Should the Attorney–Client
Privilege Extend to Communications with Public Relations Consultants?, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 545,
549 50 (2005); Emily Jones, Keeping Client Confidences: Attorney–Client Privilege and Work
Product Doctrine in Light of United States v. Adlman, 18 PACE L. REV. 419, 421 22 (1998).
27. Murphy, supra note 26, at 550.
28. See Sexton, supra note 25, at 446 By the last quarter of the eighteenth century, however,
the doctrine fell out of favor and was rejected as antithetical to the judicial search for truth.
WIGMORE, supra
quarter of the 1700s . . .
29. Sexton, supra note 25, at 446; WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2290, at 543 44.
30. WIGMORE, supra note 23, §§ 2290 91, at 541 54; see also Elizabeth G.
Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate Attorney–Client Privilege, 69
NOTRE DAME L. REV.
[m]ost purpose myths supporting the attorney
client privilege today are utilitarian ones. In other words, rather than claiming that the privilege is
intrinsically good, these myths claim that the privilege furthe
31. Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 267. But see Sexton, supra note 25, at 464 ( [S]everal
commentators have argued that because of the exigencies of the regulatory state and because of their
general business needs, corporations would communicate with attorneys even if the privilege were not
available. Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 363 66 (1989)
c to assume that clients would avoid lawyers to any significant degree

C M
Y K
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Despite the fact that the privilege is codified, the attorney client privilege
35

between an attorney and her client, and the truth finding process, which is
essential to the success of the American judicial system. As stated by Dean
...
36
is an exemption to this r
Although an advocate of the attorney client privilege, Dean Wigmore
37
Even
be recognized only within the narrowest limits r
today, the attorney client privilege stands at odds with the discovery rules of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.38 Furthermore, unlike the work product
doctrine,39 the attorney client privilege is absolute in nature.40 This means that
unless the client has waived the privilege or a legislative exception exists, the
communication will not be exposed regardless of how relevant the information
is.41 By allowing communications between an attorney and a client to be

C M
Y K

01/29/2019 13:38:24

FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii),
the opposing party cannot override the [attorney client privilege claim] after the
fact merely by showing a desperate need for the privileged information; it is

40986 mqt_102-2 Sheet No. 156 Side A

35. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
36. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2192, at 70.
37. Id. at 73.
38. Jones, supra note 26, at 425; see FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (outlining explicit instances when the
parties have a duty to disclose information).
39. Many cases that involve the attorney client privilege also involve the work product doctrine
in part because third-party consultants may be asked to create a memorandum with recommendations
for the attorney or client. See, e.g., United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495 (2d Cir. 1995). A full
exploration of the effects of the attorney client privilege, the Kovel doctrine, and the work product
doctrine is outside the bounds of this Comment. While this Comment does not fully explore the work
product doctrine, the work product doctrine is still relevant to the discussion of the attorney client
privilege because the attorney
In addition, the work product
doctrine claim does not render moot the attorney client privilege in the context of third-party
consultants because (1) courts can pierce the work product doctrine, (2) the doctrine only covers advice
given in response to litigation, and (3) the circumstances in which the work product doctrine is invoked
are different than the circumstances that typically apply the attorney client privilege. See Beardslee,
supra note 5, at 755 59. For a discussion on the work product doctrine in connection with the attorney
client privilege, see Gruetzmacher, supra note 17, at 989 94; Jones, supra note 26, at 433 46.
40. Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 270 71.
41. Id. The fact that a privilege is absolute does not mean that it does not yield. Id. at 275.
Rather, the claim can be defeated by a showing that the client waived the privilege, such as by
disclosing the information to third-party consultants. See id. However, unlike the work product
substantial need for the materials to prepare
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privileged, relevant evidence may be suppressed,42
43
investigative or fact44

Despite the tension between the openness of the discovery and litigation
process, and the secrecy of the attorney client privileged communications, the
attorney client privilege is important because it encourages open
45

proper performance of the functions of lawyers acting for their clients,

46

such

47

In addition to having social utility, there are other arguments as to why the
attorney client privilege is beneficial and should not be constructed too
narrowly.48 Clients are more willing to discuss important information if they
immaterial that the party now needs the information in order to sustain his or her
initial burden of production and avoid a directed verdict, nonsuit, or judgment as
a matter of law.
Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 275 76; see also State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559,
581, 150 N.W.2d 387, 399 400 (1967) (
ions can be utilized, the
protection afforded by the [attorney client] privilege is absolute. No showing of necessity, hardship,
or injustice can require an attorney to reveal the protected information if his client does not waive the
privilege, no matter how necessary the information is to a resolution of the particular issue on its

01/29/2019 13:38:24
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42. Sexton, supra note 25, at 446.
43.
of Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 901 N.E.2d 1185, 1195 (Mass. 2009) (quoting
Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Servs., 870 N.E.2d 1105, 1111 (Mass. 2007)).
44. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2192, at 73 (
testimonial duty demand the restriction, not the expansion, of these privileges. . . . Every step beyond
these limits helps to provide, without any real necessity, an obstacle to the admini
45. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
46. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1195 (quoting Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Servs., 870
N.E.2d 1105, 1111 (Mass. 2007).
47. Id.
48. For example, some argue an instrumental rationale for the attorney client privilege, which
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5472, at 80 (1st ed. 1986).
There are five steps for understanding the application of the attorney client privilege under this
instrumental argument:
1.
Id. at 80. Given that lawyers find it difficult to be
aware of all legal rules, a layperson would find it almost impossible to
discover or understand the law for a particular action, let alone understand
the procedural rules for trial. Id. at 80 81.
2.
ublic interest that citizens should understand the law and this
can best be accomplished by allowing them to obtain advice from persons
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know that the attorney will not disclose or repeat the confidential
communications.49 If the privilege did not exist, it would irreparably harm the
administration of advice because clients would be less likely to divulge relevant
and necessary information.50 Sound legal advice can only occur if all available
facts are disclosed to the attorney.51 In addition, the privilege may also
encourage individuals and corporations to comply with regulatory laws since
they are more likely to communicate with attorneys if they know that their
communications will be privileged.52 Therefore, while the attorney client
. . . [and] its
its continued application and success.53 However, many argue that the scope
of t
strictly confined within the narrowest possible

Id. at 81.
3.
it is said that the lawyer must be informed by the client of all
of the facts, good and bad,
Id. at 82. This is
a controversial empirical proposition because it has never been tested and
likely never will be tested. Id.
4.

al., supra note 49, at 897 (arguing that limiting the attorney client privilege would have a negative
impact on the American justice system. Clients, knowing that their communications would be subject
to disclosure, would ultimately be less forthright with their lawyers or sacrifice legal services
completely. Jones, supra
client privilege helps calm the fear of
potential clients that their communications with the attorney may be disclosed to a third
party, keeping the potential client from seeking legal advice from an attorney.
51. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 4
sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the

C M
Y K

01/29/2019 13:38:24

52. Jones, supra note 26, at 424.
53. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2291, at 554.
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facts that were thought to be favorable to their case or useful in obtaining
Id. at 83. Again,
this point is controversial and subject to many critiques. See id. at 83 84.
5.
client
communications outweigh the costs of suppressing evidence of those
Id. at 84. This is the most critiqued proposition. See id.
49. Carl Pacini et al., Accountants, Attorney–Client Privilege, and the Kovel Rule: Waiver
Through Inadvertent Disclosure via Electronic Communication, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 893, 897 (2003);
United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 539 (5th Cir. 1982) ( he purpose of the privilege is to
foster full client disclosure to the lawyer; the privilege exists to assure the client that his private
disclosures will not become common knowledge. ).
50. See WIGMORE, supra note 23,
of consultation
of legal advisers by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal advisers must be
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limits consistent with the logic of its principle. 54 As we will see later on, the
tension between disclosure and confidentiality, as well as the public policy
considerations, are extremely important for courts when considering whether to
expand the attorney client privilege to third-party consultants.55
Because the attorney client privilege is based on common law, courts have
formulated several tests to determine the applicability of the privilege.56 Each
test contains the same elements articulated in a different manner.57 One of the
most common formulations of the attorney client privilege is the following:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought, (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently

54. Id.; see
(stating that the attorney

95 (Mass. 2009)

In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d
the privilege applies only to the extent necessary to achieve its
underlying goal of ensuring effective representation through open communication between lawyer

40986 mqt_102-2 Sheet No. 157 Side B

55. See infra Part IV.
56. Jones, supra note 26, at 422 23; Pacini et al., supra note 49, at 899 ( Various tests have been
set forth by the courts to determine whether the attorney client privilege applies to a particular case.
57. For example, one formulation that courts use is the following:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the
person to whom the communication was made (a) is [the] member of a bar of a
court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting
as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was
informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose
of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii)
assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a
crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the
client.
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1975); Cottillion v. United Ref.
Co., 279 F.R.D. 290, 298 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting In re
No. 01 12295DWS, 2005
WL 3299823, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2005)). Regardless of which test is used, the
party claiming the privilege [must] prove the existence of each of the following
elements: 1. The holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; 2. The
person to whom a communication is made is a licensed attorney or his agent; 3.
The attorney is acting as the
and 4. The communication relates to a matter of which the attorney was informed
by his client, without the presence of third parties, for the purpose of securing
legal services and not for the purpose of committing a crime or tort.
Pacini et al., supra note 49, at 899. According to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 68 (AM. LAW INST. 1998), the attorney client privilege may be invoked when
(1)
a communication, (2) made between privileged persons, (3) in confidence, (4) for the purpose of

01/29/2019 13:38:24
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protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,
(8) except the protection be waived.58
Regardless of which formulation a court articulates, the party claiming the
privilege has the burden to establish each element of the privilege.59 In addition,
attorney client privilege only applies to the communications rendered, not the
underlying facts of the case.60 Furthermore, the privilege only applies to legal
advice given, not to business advice.61 For in-house attorneys who typically
confront business considerations when rendering legal advice to corporate
clients, this may prove to be a vital and important distinction,62 especially if the
individual is an attorney and occupies a business role in the organization.63
Indeed, courts have applied a higher scrutiny to in-house counsel in comparison

58. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2292, at 554; Lisa Borelli Flynn, CEO, CFO, COO . . . Cube
Dweller? Attorney–Client Privilege and Corporate Communication: Whose Communications Should
Massachusetts Law Protect?, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 701, 706 (2010) (quoting Brian M. Smith,
Be Careful How You Use It or You May Lose It: A Modern Look at Corporate Attorney–Client
Privilege and the Ease of Waiver in Various Circuits, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 389, 392 93 (1998));
Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 245 (1st Cir. 2002); Comcast, 901 N.E.2d 1185, 1194 (Mass.
2009).
59. United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1461 (7th Cir. 1997).
60. Pacini et al., supra note 49, at 898; Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 644
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (
disclosure of the underlying facts by th
61. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359
Where
a communication neither invited nor expressed any legal opinion whatsoever, but involved the mere

necessarily lost, however, when some non-legal information is included in a communication seeking
62.
umen is sought at every turn, even average attorneys mix legal advice with business,
see also Hardy, 114 F.R.D. at 643
hen the ultimate corporate
decision is based on both a business policy and a legal evaluation, the business aspects of the decision
63. See Zullig v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., No. 87 2342, 1989 WL 7901, at *2 3 (D.
Kan. Jan. 17, 1989) (emphasis omitted) (finding that a committee meeting and business report did not
become shielded by the attorney client privilege because the communications were not shared with in-

40986 mqt_102-2 Sheet No. 158 Side A

that an attorney employed in a business position is providing business advice while an attorney
employed in a legal department of a business is providing legal advice. Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc.,
No. 02 C 50509, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11485, at *10 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 2003). However, courts will
protect communications that contain business advice if the primary purpose of the advice was legal in
nature. See
he
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to outside counsel when determining if the advice given was for legal or
business purposes.64
Overall, the communications must be made in confidence for the purposes
of rendering legal advice.65 Because the client is the holder of the privilege,
only the client can waive the privilege.66 If the communications are not
confidential, then the attorney client privilege does not apply to the
communications, and the privilege is waived.67 Such waivers can occur by
disclosing the communications to a third party or making the communications
in the presence of a third party.68
However, clients do not waive the attorney client privilege if the privilege

01/29/2019 13:38:24

C M
Y K

40986 mqt_102-2 Sheet No. 158 Side B

64. In re
position as an inthe
company proves with a clear showing that the inChandola v. Seattle Hous. Auth., No. 13-cv-00557RSM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
W]hile attorney client privilege is
always strictly construed, extra scrutiny is required where in-house counsel is involved, as in-house
counsel often act in both a legal and non-legal business capacity, and communications made in this
latter capacity are
Therefore, although the mix of business and legal advice may not
prevent the privilege from applying, in-house attorneys have a higher burden to meet when compared
to outside attorneys. See Jones, supra note 26, at 462 64 (arguing that the higher level of scrutiny for
in-house counsel is appropriate given the public policies that the courts have articulated and are
attempting to achieve).
65.
The relationship of attorney
and client, a communication by the client relating to the subject matter upon which professional advice
is sought, and the confidentiality of the expression for which the protection is claimed, all must be
).
66. Jones, supra note 26, at 422.
67. Gruetzmacher, supra note 17, at 979; Cottillion v. United Ref. Co., 279 F.R.D. 290, 298
(W.D. Pa. 2011) ( A communication is not made in confidence, and, therefore, is not privileged if
persons other than the client, the attorney,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 91, at 555 (Kenneth S. Brom et al. eds., 7th ed. 2013) (
limited to those communications that the client either expressly made confidential or which he could
reasonably assume under the circumstances would be understood by the attorney as so intended. );
United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 539 (5th Cir. 1982) (
communications with secrecy, however, ends when the secrets p
).
68. See Schwimmer, 892 F.2d at 243 ( he attorney client privilege generally forbids an attorney
from disclosing confidential communications that pass in the course of professional employment from
client to lawyer. ); Beardslee, supra note 5, at 744 [T]he privilege does not apply or is considered
waived when the client voluntarily discloses an otherwise confidential, privileged communication to a
; Pacini et al., supra note 49, at 898 99 ( If a client communicates a matter to his lawyer
in the presence of a third party who is not an agent of the lawyer, the communication is
not confidential. ).
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and the communication is necessary to facilitate legal advice.69 Under this
exception, the communication is still considered confidential and protected by
the attorney client privilege despite the fact that a third party has been exposed
to the communication.70 Due to the complexity of the legal practice, courts
have extended the attorney client privilege to multiple types of legal agents,
such as clerks71 or interpreters.72 As previously noted, the Second Circuit has
applied the attorney client privilege to confidential communications shared
between the client, attorney, and an accountant because the accountant was
necessary or helpful to the attorney in rendering the legal advice.73 As this
Comment will explore later on, the application of the attorney client privilege
to third-party professional consultants is not a predictable or clear standard to
follow.74 There is not a single consensus among the federal or state courts as
to the proper scope of the privilege to communications between third-party
consultants.75 This lack of consensus among the federal courts makes it harder
for states who have not yet confronted the Kovel doctrine, such as Wisconsin,
to determine its applicability and scope.
B. Attorney–Client Privilege and Corporations
It was not always intuitive that the attorney client privilege would be
available to corporations since the privilege was originally asserted by
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Y K
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71. See Smith v. Mitchell (In re
01 (N.Y. 1931).
72. See Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equip. Corp., 757 A.2d 14, 23 (Conn. 2000) (stating that
as a general rule
attorney client privilege
interpreters, and to clerks and agents
employe
(quoting Goddard v. Gardner, 28 Conn. 172, 175 (Conn. 1859)). Courts
have also extended the attorney client privilege to other third parties or agents who provided necessary
information for the rendering of legal advice, such as parents or adult children. See Hendrick v. Avis
Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 187, 188 90 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); Stroh v. Gen. Motors Corp., 623
N.Y.S.2d 873 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). Although there are multiple types of third parties and agents,
this Comment will primarily focus on the third-party professional consultants that attorneys tend to
contact for their expertise and knowledge, such as accountants, public relations consultants, investment
bankers, or actuarial consultants.
73. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961).
74. See infra Section IV.A and accompanying notes.
75. See infra Section IV.A and accompanying notes.
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69.
An
exception to [the attorney client privilege waiver] rule exists for third parties who assist an attorney in
rendering legal advice. ).
70. Mileski v. Locker, 178 N.Y.S.2d 911, 915
a general rule, a
communication by a client to his attorney by any form of agency employed or set in motion by the
client is within the privilege. Accordingly, communications to any person whose intervention is
necessary to secure and facilitate the communication between attorney and client are privileged, as
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individuals.76 However, as early as 1915, the Supreme Court tacitly allowed a
corporation to utilize the attorney client privilege without explicitly addressing
whether corporations in general could in fact claim such a privilege.77 It was
not until 1963 in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass’n that a Federal
Court of Appeals first directly answered the question as to whether a
corporation can assert the attorney client privilege in the same manner as an
individual.78
privilege to a corporation,79
history, principle, precedent and public policy the attorney client privilege in
80
Thus, rather than tacitly
accepting the proposition, the courts after Radiant Burners expressed the
proposition that corporations had the right to claim attorney client privilege.81
Because the attorney client privilege was typically asserted by individuals,
the lower courts still grappled with the exact application of the attorney client
privilege to corporations even after it was accepted that corporations could
bring a privilege claim.82 Because corporations are fictional entities, they can
only act through their employees or agents, which can range in the hundreds for
Upjohn Co. v.
large corporations.83

40986 mqt_102-2 Sheet No. 159 Side B

76. See
18 (7th Cir. 1963).
77. In United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318 (1915), the Supreme Court
allowed a railroad company to withhold confidential memorandums and communications between the
corporation and its attorneys. Rather than examine whether the corporation could even assert any
privilege, the Supreme Court tacitly found that the privilege could be asserted and stated that
[t]he desirability of protecting confidential communications between attorney and
client as a matter of public policy is too well known and has been too often
recognized by textbooks and courts to need extended comment now. If such
communications were required to be made the subject of examination and
publication, such enactment would be a practical prohibition upon professional
advice and assistance.
Id. at 336.
78. 320 F.2d at 323.
79. See id. at 317.
80. Id. at 323; see also City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 484
he availability of the privilege to corporations has gone unchallenged so
long and has been so generally accepted that I must recognize that it doe
81. Sexton, supra note 25, at 448.
82. Id. at 449.
83. Id. ( [A] corporate entity can speak only through its agents or employees, and there are often
see also Petrina
v. Allied Glove Corp., 46 A.3d 795, 799 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (
oration is a creature of legal
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United States,84 the courts were widely split over which employees were
considered agents of the corporations for the application of the attorney client
privilege.85
In Upjohn, the Supreme Court did not adopt or delineate a specific test for
determining which employee communications were covered by the attorney
client privilege.86 Instead, it articulated a broad, expansive, case-by-case
analysis87 that encouraged protection of the confidential communication shared
between any level employee and counsel if the communications were made for

Id.
principles of the common law as . . . interpreted . . .
frustrate[d] the very purpose of the privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant
information by employees of the client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client
corporation. Id. at 392, 397 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501). However, the Supreme Court never
mentioned the subject matter test by name in its opinion. See generally id.; Sexton, supra note 25, at
458 59. Despite not articulating the subject matter test, some commentators think that the Upjohn
opinion favors the subject matter test. For example, Imwinkelried notes the following:
[O]ne of the essential functions of the privilege is to enable the client to convey
to the attorney the
to advise the client. In stressing that factor, though, the Court clearly gravitated
toward one of the central policy considerations underlying the subject-matter test.
Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 296.
87. Upjohn
we decide only the case before us, and do not undertake

40986 mqt_102-2 Sheet No. 160 Side A

84. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
85. Courts typically adopted one of two approaches to determine whether the attorney client
privilege applied to corporate communications: the control group test and the subject matter test. See
Flynn, supra note 58, at 708. Under the control group test, the attorney client privilege applied to
those employees who had control of the decision-making process. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210
[I]f the employee making the communication . . . is in a position to control or even
to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may take . . . then, in
effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the
Under the subject matter test, the attorney client privilege applied to
employee communications made to counsel if the communications were made at the directions of
See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,
423 F.2d 487, 491 92 (7th Cir. 1970) (finding that the
the communication at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and where the subject matter
with in the communication is
For a more thorough discussion
of the control and subject matter tests, see Sexton, supra note 25, at 449 56.
86. The Supreme Court was aware that the lower courts were grappling with two tests. See
Upjohn
various amici have described our task as one of choosing between two
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the purpose of receiving legal advice.88 In articulating such a standard, the
Court stated that the purpose of the attorney
full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
[t]he privilege recognizes that sound
justice. 89
legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy
90
Therefore,
while the Supreme Court did not delineate a specific test to determinate what
communications with employees were covered by the attorney client privilege,
the Supreme Court embraced a broader application of the privilege and
demonstrated a public commitment to protecting confidential communications
This underlying rationale and
purpose behind the attorney client privilege further helps guide the discussion,
as we will see, in determining if and how Wisconsin should adopt the Kovel
doctrine.91
III. ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE & THIRD-PARTY CONSULTANTS
A. The Kovel Doctrine
While Upjohn articulated a broad application of the attorney client
privilege to corporate employees, corporations are increasingly utilizing thirdparty consultants to streamline business models, reduce costs, or gain expertise
on a subject matter.92 Because business and legal advice are often intertwined,93
the rise of third-party consultants means that courts are increasingly confronted
with the question of whether confidential communication with a third-party
consultant waives the attorney client privilege.
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88. See Beardslee, supra note 5, at 742
he Court adopted a case-by-case approach that in
practice has resulted in an expansive rule emphasizing the importance of the flow of information
between corporate employees and attorneys for sound legal advic
Flynn, supra note 58, at 712
Although the Court did not adopt an explicit
protected in Upjohn, the Court did apply a broader, more subject matter-like test to the facts at hand. ).
89. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
90. Id.
91. See infra Sections IV.B, IV.C.
92. See supra Part I and accompanying notes; see also Nancy Mann Jackson, How to Build a
Better Business with Outsourcing, ENTREPRENEUR, https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/204652
[https://perma.cc/BG26-L6H8] (last visited Aug. 31, 2018).
93. See supra Part I and accompanying notes.
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In the landmark case of United States v. Kovel,94 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit was the first court to grapple with this issue.
Kovel has since become the seminal case on the application of attorney client
privilege to third-party communications.95 Kovel was a former career IRS
agent in accounting who was employed at a tax law firm. 96 When the IRS
testify in front of the grand jury.97 Although Kovel appeared in court, he
on any work he performed for the client on the grounds that such
communications and documents were protected by the attorney client
privilege.98 The district court found Kovel in contempt, and Kovel was
sentenced to a year in jail.99
Unlike the circuit court, the court of appeals found that the attorney client
privilege did extend to the communications shared between the client and the
accountant because the accountant assisted the attorney in rendering legal
advice.100
complexities of modern existence prevent attorneys from effectively handling
101
The court analogized the
accountant to that of an interpreter stating that it
can see no significant difference between a case where the
attorney sends a client speaking a foreign language to an

behalf and then render his own summary of the situation,
perhaps drawing on his own knowledge in the process, so that
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94. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
95. Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 280, 284 85.
96. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 919.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 919 20.
99. Id. at 920.
100. Id. at 922 23.
101. Id. at 921.
assistance of secretaries, file clerks, telephone operators, messengers, clerks not yet admitted to the
Id.
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second where the attorney, himself having some little
knowledge of the foreign tongue, has a more knowledgeable
non-lawyer employee in the room to help out; a third where
someone to perform that same function has been brought along
by the client; and a fourth where the attorney, ignorant of the
foreign language, sends the client to a non-lawyer proficient in
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the attorney can give the client proper legal advice.102
In particular, the court noted that accounting concepts can function as a
foreign language to lawyers.103
does not destroy the privilege, then the court rationalized that the presence of
an accountant, who is translating complex tax information for the lawyer,
should not destroy the privilege either.104 For the privilege to be applicable, the
he presence of the accountant [must be] necessary, or at least
highly useful, for the effective consultation between the client and the lawyer
105

In holding that a third-party consultant may be covered by the attorney
client privilege, the Second Circuit also articulated a few other principles. First,
the court stated that it did not matter if the attorney or the client hired the
accountant.106 Second, the court also placed an emphasis on the type of
communications shared rather than the way in which the communications

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id. at 922.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.

. . . or if the advice
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109. Id.; see also Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 273 for an explanation on the three different
types of communication that occur between the attorney, client, and third-party consultant.
110. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922.
111. Id.

40986 mqt_102-2 Sheet No. 161 Side B

that the communication be made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining
107
As long as the information sought is for legal
advice rather than business advice or accounting advice, then the privilege
exists.108 It does not matter if the lawyer directs the client to communicate with
the accountant and then the accountant interprets the information for the lawyer
to give accurate legal advice to the client.109 As long as the communications
are confidential and enable the attorney to give legal advice, then the privilege
applies.
However, the cou
If the client first
communications are covered by the privilege.110
communicates with an accountant and then later communicates with the
attorney on the same matter, the privilege would not apply.111 On the other
hand, if a lawyer directs a client to communicate with an accountant or if the
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client communicates with a lawyer while an accountant is present, then the
privilege would apply if the communications were rendered for legal
advice.112
In sum, the Second Circuit extended the attorney client privilege to thirdparty consultants who translated confidential communications necessary or
helpful in the rendering of effective legal advice. Under Kovel, as long as
confidential communications are made after an attorney has been retained on
the matter, the communications are likely to be privileged if they are for legal
advice. Therefore, the Kovel doctrine has broad implications for corporations
that are increasingly hiring third-party consultants.
B. Narrow Interpretation
Since the Second Circuit decided Kovel, some courts have increasingly
narrowed their application of the Kovel doctrine to third-party consultants,
limiting the circumstances under which the attorney client privilege can be
applied to third parties. Narrow interpretations of the Kovel doctrine typically
consider factors such as (1) whether there is sufficient evidence, other than the
substance of the communications, to determine that the consultant was hired for
the facilitation of legal advice;113 (2) whether the third-party consultant
performs as a translator of client only information;114 or (3) whether the
communication is necessary, not just useful or important, for the rendering of
legal advice.115
1. Communications Protected if Sufficient Contemporaneous Evidence

C M
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Id.
See United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1500 (2d Cir. 1995).
See id.
See United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999).
68 F.3d 1495 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1497.
Id. at 1496 97.
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United States v. Adlman116 is instructive in understanding a narrow
interpretation of the Kovel doctrine. Here, the Second Circuit determined that
the attorney client privilege did not apply to outside accountants if the
company failed to meet its evidentiary burden or failed to provide sufficient
evidence. In Adlman, the company Sequa was considering a reorganization of
for Taxes,
its subsidiaries.117
contacted Arthur Andersen & Co. (AA) to help assess the tax implications of
the reorganization.118 AA and its accountants created a fifty-eight-page
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memorandum detailing the tax consequences of the reorganization.119 Sequa
120

Because of this reorganization, Sequa received a large tax refund, which caused
the IRS to undertake an audit of the company.121 When the IRS requested all
documentation related to the reorganization, Adlman refused to give the IRS
it was privileged.122
The Second Circuit found that the attorney client privilege did not apply
because Adlman failed to meet his burden in establishing all of the elements of
the privilege. 123 Adlman thus demonstrates that courts applying a narrower
interpretation may require strict compliance to meet the Kovel doctrine.124 The
court found that AA was hired to provide tax advice rather than hired to
interpret client communications.125 Furthermore, Adlman served as both an
attorney and as a Vice President for Taxes.126 The fact that Adlman occupied
the

Id. at 1497.
Id.
Id. at 1497 98.
Id. at 1498.
See id. at 1500.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1496, 1500.
Id. at 1500.
Id.
Id.
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122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
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Adlman render legal advice on the reorganization.127 Rather, the information
for the fifty-eight-page memorandum on the tax implications originated from
tise and knowledge.128 Thus, the accountants were
not acting under the analogy as interpreters to facilitate the rendering of legal
advice, but instead were performing their traditional third-party consultant
duties. Therefore, because Sequa provided the accounting firm with
information to get advice on the potential tax implications of the reorganization
rather than for legal advice, the attorney client privilege did not apply.
The court in Adlman
contemporaneous documentation supporting the proposition that Adlman hired
AA to help provide legal advice.129 Sequa regularly employed AA to perform
auditing, accounting, and advisory services for the company, and AA
extensively helped Sequa with the reorganization in other respects, such as
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through advisory services.130 While AA performed services with both Sequa
virtually no contemporaneous documentation
supporting the view that AA, in this task alone, was working under a different
131
This
lack of contemporaneous documentation indicated that the work AA provided
to Adlman was not any different than the accounting services it typically
provided to Sequa.132
Therefore, when determining whether Adlman met his burden on all
elements of the privilege, the court placed significant emphasis on the evidence
relating to documentation surrounding the services instead of focusing solely
on the substance of the communications.133 Although the court mentioned that
134
elevation
some
135
136
commentators
and courts
have indeed found such contemporaneous
documentation instructive when determining if attorney client privilege
applies to third-party consultants.
Based on this narrow interpretation of the Kovel doctrine, there are certain
steps that companies or individuals can take before communicating with a thirdparty consultant to protect such communications. First, the attorney, rather than
the client, should hire the third-party consultant because it will emphasize the
proposition that the attorney hired the consultant to facilitate the service of legal
advice.137 For corporations, an outside counsel, rather than in-house counsel,

while those who are a bit sloppy will not, despite the true nature of the relationship
between the lawyer, accountant, and client.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Beardslee, supra note 5, at 792 93 (arguing that courts should not
consider form over substance when determining whether the attorney client privilege applies because
it is an artificial distinction); Pacini et al., supra
t is incumbent upon those
claiming attorney client privilege to produce adequate documentation to demonstrate that the main
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136. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 325 26 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); see also Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 248 (1st Cir. 2002).
137. Pacini et al., supra note 49, at 924.
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130. Id.
131. Id.
advisory services to Sequa. Id. In addition, AA, not Adlman, created all the written documentation for
the tax implications of the reorganization. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1500 n.1.
135. See Gruetzmacher, supra note 17, at 984
[D]etermining whether the attorney-client privilege applies to communications
with accountants involves analyzing form over substance. Therefore, those who
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should hire the third-party consultant, if possible, since courts tend to place a
higher scrutiny on in-house counsel to prove that the communications were
rendered for legal and not business advice.138 Second, a written engagement
letter should be produced between the attorney and the consultant.139 The
engagement letter should state that the third-party consultant is being hired to
enable the giving of legal advice; that all communications between the thirdparty consultant, the attorney, and the client are intended to be confidential
according to the attorney client privilege; the precise scope of the relationship
between the attorney and the third-party consultant; and that all work product
produced by the third-party consultant belongs to the law firm and must be
surrendered when requested.140 Third, if possible, the third-party consultant
should not be a consultant that the company uses on regular basis, e.g., hiring
an accountant for legal tax advice who also performs accounting services for
the corporation.141 Fourth, the attorney should be billed an itemized statement
by the third-party consultant and pay the expenses, not the client.142 The
attorney can then send an itemized invoice to the client with the third
costs listed in the invoice as expenses.143 Although the court in Adlman stated
that such actions were not necessary, performing these steps, while not
determinative, will help a proponent establish the necessary elements of the
attorney client privilege under the Kovel doctrine.
2. Communications Protected only if Translating Client Information
Some courts strictly applying the Kovel doctrine have also hesitated to
adopt the attorney client privilege to communications with third parties if the

01/29/2019 13:38:24
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138. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
139. Martin A. Schainbaum, The Scope and Limitations of the Kovel Accountant, CHAMPION,
Mar. 2016, at 26, 28.
140. Id.; Cheryl C. Magat, How Attorney–Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine May
Apply to Third Parties in Tax Law, PRAC. TAX LAW., Summer 2011, at 21, 23.
141. See, e.g., United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1500 (2d Cir. 1995).
142. Pacini et al., supra note 49, at 928.
143. Id.
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information did not originate from the client.144 In United States v. Ackert,145
the Second Circuit did not extend the attorney client privilege to an investment
banker in part because the third-party consultant did not translate any client
communications.146 In this case, Ackert, an investment banker at Goldman
Sachs, approached a company with an investment proposition which was
expected to lower its federal income tax liability.147
president and tax counsel, Meyers, conducted research on the proposal and
148

Although the company decided to enter into the proposed investment with
another investment banker, it still paid Goldman Sachs $1.5 million for its
services.149
During an audit of the company seven years after the investment, the IRS
issued a summons for Ackert to testify.150 The company asserted that any
communications Ackert had with Meyers were covered by the attorney client
privilege under the Kovel doctrine.151 Despite Ackert being an investment
banker rather than an accountant, the company asserted that the
communications between the two mirrored that of the accountant attorney
under Kovel
152

However, the court refused to extend the Kovel doctrine from an accountant
to an investment banker because Ackert did not translate information that

01/29/2019 13:38:24
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144. Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 284 ( [C]ourts have been reluctant to apply the doctrine to
situations in which the client cannot realistically be characterized as the source of the information
evaluated by the expert. ); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 161 63
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that privilege did not apply to third-party engineers because the engineers
Eprova v. Gnosis
S.p.A., No. 07 civ. 5898, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101215, *3 7 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 24, 2010) (holding that
the attorney client privilege did not apply to scientific experts who were providing scientific
information themselves rather than acting as interpreters); EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY
CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
collected from the client . . . and is digested by the expert for transmission to the attorney so that the
attorney may render legal advice, there is substantial
attorney client privilege).
145. 169 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1999).
146. Id. at 139 40.
147. Id. at 138.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 138 39.
152. Id. at 139.
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originated from the client.153 Rather, because the company did not have the
information regarding the investment proposal and did not know the tax
consequences, the information communicated between Ackert and Meyers
banker.154 Therefore, because Ackert was not acting as a translator of client
communication but rather was utilizing his own expertise to furnish the
communication, the attorney client privilege did not apply.155
Ackert thus stands for the proposition that the Kovel doctrine will only apply
if the third-party consultant merely transla
wn communication.
If the third-party consultant relies on his or her own expertise, a court applying
the Kovel doctrine narrowly would likely find that the privilege does not apply.
3. Communications Protected if Necessary, not just Important or Useful
Some courts have also limited the holding in Kovel by finding that the
communications between the third-party consultant and the attorney must be
more than just important or useful to the rendering of legal advice; instead, the
communications must be necessary.156 Cavallaro v. United States157 was the
first case to determine that the attorney client privilege did not apply to an
accountant because the communication provided was not necessary to the
furnishing of legal advice.158 In Cavallaro, two parents owned a company
while their sons owned a glue dispensing manufacturing company.159 In an
attempt to merge the two companies, the sons communicated with trust and
estate attorneys and with accountants regarding the merger.160 Based upon this
communication, the accountants
161
Following the advice of the accountants, the two corporations
Meyers was not relying on Ackert to translate or interpret information
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154. Id. at 139
Ackert for information Paramount did not
have about the proposed transaction and its tax
155. See id. at 140.
156. See, e.g., Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236 (1st Cir. 2002); Ackert, 169 F.3d at 136
98 (Mass. 2009);
Calvin Klein Trademark Tr. v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (refusing to extend the
attorney client privilege to PR consultants and their related work documents in part because the
possibility that the documents may later be important for the facilitation of legal advice was not
sufficient for the privilege to apply).
157. 284 F.3d at 236.
158. Id. at 240, 249.
159. Id. at 240.
160. Id. at 239 41.
161. Id. at 240 41.
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merged and later sold for $97 million.162 The IRS began an investigation into
the merger for tax fraud.163 The IRS served the accounting firm for the records
164
and requested the
memorandums dealing with the merger. The defendants refused to produce the
documents on the grounds that accoun
165

In finding that the accountants were not within the Kovel doctrine, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit quoted Kovel and stated
to sustain a privilege a
useful, for the effective consultation between the client and the lawyer, which
166
Despite the fact that Kovel
characterized the privilege as applying if the communic
167
the First Circuit limited the circumstances in which
168

Rather, the communication with the third-party
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162. Id. at 243.
163. Id. at 239. Specifically, the IRS was examining whether the parties had undervalued the
Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 239, 242.
166. Id. at 247 48 (quoting United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961)).
167. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922.
168. Cavallaro, 284 F.3d at 249 (quoting EDNA S. EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE
AND THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE 187 (4th ed. 2001)).
169. Id.
170. United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999).
171. Id.

40986 mqt_102-2 Sheet No. 165 Side A

facilitating the attorney-client communications. Mere convenience is not
169
Such a characterization allows courts to scrutinize and limit the
circumstances under which communications with third-party consultants could
be protected.
In addition to the communication being necessary, the court in Ackert also
articulated that the attorney client privilege does not apply to a third-party
consultant even if the communica
rendering legal advice.170 Although Meyers, the attorney, likely communicated
with Ackert, the investment banker, to gain information and offer better legal
advice to the company, the court found that such a distinction was not sufficient
for the application of the privilege.171 In particular, the court stated that the
privilege protects communications between a client and an
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attorney, not communications that prove important to an
client. . . . [A] communication
between an attorney and a third party does not become shielded
by the attorney client privilege solely because the
represent the client.172
Therefore, even though communications between an attorney and a third
party may be important and relevant for the attorney to render effective legal
advice, if the communications are not necessary or nearly indispensable, a court
applying a narrow application of the Kovel doctrine may be unwilling to apply
the privilege to communications with third-party consultants.173
C. Broad Interpretation
Some courts have also adopted a broader interpretation of the Kovel
doctrine.174 Jurisdictions adopting a broad interpretation of the Kovel doctrine
typically apply the attorney client privilege to communications that are helpful
in facilitating legal advice.175 For example, in Aull v. Cavalcade Pension
Plan,176 the court found that communications between an attorney, client, and
outside accountant were covered by the attorney client privilege under the

of lawyers to perform some of their most fundamental client functions . . . would be undermined
seriously if lawyers were not able to engage in frank discussions of facts and strategies with the
175. Beardslee, supra note 5, at 731; Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 284
[S]ome
jurisdictions broadly invoke the doctrine whenever the expert helps the attorney give the client fully

01/29/2019 13:38:24

176. 185 F.R.D. 618 (D. Colo. 1998).
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172. Id.
173. See
Mass. 2009) (analyzing the
narrow interpretation of the Kovel doctrine, including both Cavallaro and Ackert, before determining
that the attorney client privilege did not apply).
174. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 232 F.R.D. 467, 477 (E.D. Pa. 2005)
Plaintiff did not waive the privilege merely by revealing confidential communications
United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046 (3d Cir. 1975) (applying the
attorney client privilege to a psychiatric expert because the court did not see
the need of defense counsel for expert assistance in accounting matters and the same need in matters
Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 518 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
f the patent agent is acting to assist an attorney to provide legal services, the communications with
him by the attorney or the client should come within the ambit of the privilege ; Cuno, Inc. v. Pall
Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Byrnes v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, No.
98Civ.8520, 1999 WL 1006312, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1999) (finding privilege to memorandum
shared between the company, the attorney, and actuaries); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March
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Kovel doctrine.177 The court rationalized that the accountant was covered by
obtaining legal advice from the lawyer, and; 2) The communications between
the accountant, client, and the lawyer are reasonably related to the purpose of
178
This broad
interpretation of applying the Kovel doctrine whenever the third-party
consultant advice is helpful for or reasonably related to the rending of legal
advice stands in stark contrast to the narrow interpretations explained above.
The less strict interpretation of the Kovel doctrine has been applied to
physiatrists,179 patent agents,180 actuaries,181 public relations consultants,182 and
jury consultants.183
While some courts have applied a broader interpretation of the Kovel
doctrine, it has been argued that this application is the minority view of
courts.184 Commentators have also argued that courts should be cautious when
adopting a broader view of the attorney client privilege to external
consultants.185 Opponents argue that an expansion of the Kovel doctrine
primarily benefits wealthier clients and should only be done for compelling
reasons,186 or that an expansive view of the Kovel doctrine denies the public to

177. Id. at 628 30.
178. Id. at 629.
179. See, e.g., Alvarez
no distinction between the need
of defense counsel for expert assistance in accounting matters and the same need in matters of

181. Byrnes v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. 98Civ.8520, 1999 WL 1006312, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1999) (finding that attorney client privilege extends to actuaries reviewing a
assist[s] the attorney in preparing the final version of the
letter . . . [and]
182. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 330 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) This Court is persuaded that the ability of lawyers to perform some of their most fundamental
client functions . . . would be undermined seriously if lawyers were not able to engage in frank
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183. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 668 69 (3d Cir. 2003) (Garth, J., concurring).
184.
f Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 901 N.E.2d 1185, 1198 n.20 (Mass. 2009).
185. See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 311 12; Beardslee, supra note 5, at 731, 733.
186. Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 311 12.
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180. See, e.g., Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 518 19, 523 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (articulating that the privilege should apply if the patent agent was assisting the attorney);
Willemijn Houdstermaatschaapij BV v. Apollo Comput. Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1429, 1446 (D. Del. 1989)
(applying the attorney
independent patent agent, if that patent agent is working on behalf of and under the direction of the
all Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding patent documents
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While these
public policy statements may align with the purposes underlying the attorney
client privilege,189 courts have still applied a broader view of the Kovel doctrine
when the communications between an attorney and a third-party consultants
help in the facilitation or rendering of legal advice.
IV. STATES ANALYSES OF THE KOVEL DOCTRINE
A. State Adoption of the Kovel Doctrine
Whether communications between an attorney, client, and a third-party
consultant are protected under the attorney client privilege is not an isolated
federal issue. Rather, it is an issue that affects all states as well as the global
market since businesses nationwide have increasingly relied on third-party
consultants.190 Although the Kovel doctrine originated in the Federal courts and
stems from Federal Rules of Evidence 501, state courts have also addressed the
issue of whether the attorney client privilege applies to confidential
communications shared between attorneys and third-party consultants.191
Similar to the federal courts, state courts have yet to adopt a single and uniform
consensus as to how broadly or narrowly the Kovel
scope should be
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187. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2192, at 70.
188. Beardslee, supra note 5, at 731.
189. See supra Part II.
190. See supra Part I. See generally Steve Lohr, Hot Spot for Tech Outsourcing: The United
States, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/30/technology/hot-spot-fortech-outsourcing-the-united-states.html [https://perma.cc/M4RW-ZWXF].
191. See, e.g.,
ast Corp., 901 N.E.2d 1185 (Mass. 2009); Delta Fin.
Corp. v. Morrison, 820 N.Y.S.2d 745 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006); Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equip.
Corp., 757 A.2d 14 (Conn. 2000); People v. Marcy, 283 N.W.2d 754 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (citing
cases that discuss Kovel favorably and protecting communications between a polygrapher, client, and
the attorney under the attorney client privilege); People v. Paasche, 525 N.W.2d 914, 917 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1994); Bousamra v. Excela Health, 167 A.3d 728 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017); State v. Carter, 641
S.W.2d 54, 65 (Mo. 1982); State v. Aquino-Cervantes, 945 P.2d 767, 772 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (citing
Kovel favorably to determine that an interpreter is an agent of the attorney and cannot testify about
observations seen during interpretation of a client); RCC, Inc. v. Cecchi, No. 323447, 2010 Md. Cir.
Ct. LEXIS 8, at *7 9 (Nov. 18, 2010); Foisie v. Foisie, No. FA114115278S, 2017 Conn. Super. LEXIS
4333 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 2017).
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applied.192 Rather, state courts typically analyze federal cases to determine
whether the doctrine should be adopted in their jurisdiction.193
Some state courts are hesitant to adopt the Kovel doctrine broadly. The
most prominent example of a state court adopting a narrow interpretation of the
Kovel doctrine is the Massachusetts Supreme Court. In Commissioner of
Revenue v. Comcast Corp.,194 the Massachusetts Supreme Court determined
that communications between an in-house counsel and outside tax accountants
were not protected by the attorney client privilege.195 The Supreme Court held
this in part because the attorney client privilege had been narrowly constructed
s
particularly appropriate where, as here, information is being withheld from the
196
government in a tax enforcement
In adopting a narrow interpretation of the Kovel doctrine, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court analyzed and discussed multiple federal cases limiting the
original holding of the Kovel doctrine. Comcast favorably cited Cavallaro and
Ackert
arrow opinions,197 which stated that the privilege is only applicable
if the communications are necessary rather than solely useful or substantially
198
Furthermore, the court

192. Some courts call the Kovel doctrine the derivative privilege. Although the name may be
different, the application is still the same: the derivative privilege protects communications between
attorneys and a third party when the communication is necessary or helpful for the rendering of legal
advice. See, e.g., Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1196; Delta Fin. Corp., 820 N.Y.S.2d at 750 (stating that
the derivative privilege protection recognized by Kovel and subsequent cases did not apply to the
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Black & Decker court determined that
the communications were not needed to facilitate the communications between the attorney and the
third-party consultants. Id. Although the opinion is only a district court and does not seem to be very
relevant in the federal circuits, state courts have analyzed Black & Decker and used its four factors to
apply a narrow interpretation of the Kovel doctrine.
194. 901 N.E.2d 1185 (Mass. 2009).
195. Id. at 1200.
196. Id. at 1195.
197. Id. at 1197 99.
198. See supra Section III.B.3 and accompanying notes.
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193. For example, a few state courts have analyzed or mentioned the Maryland district court
opinion of Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 219 F.R.D. 87 (D. Md. 2003), to determine whether
the Kovel doctrine should apply to their fact situation. See, e.g., Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1198; Delta
Fin. Corp., 820 N.Y.S.2d at 750 51; RCC, Inc., 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 8. The federal district court
in Black & Decker decided that there were four factors to consider for the derivative privilege (Kovel
house counsel is involved, whether counsel also acts as a corporate officer; 3) whether the accountant
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decided that the communications were not made for legal advice or to help the
attorney comprehend client information but instead for tax advice.199 Even
liance was not
Therefore, by quoting and citing other
sufficient for the privilege to apply.
cases with a narrow application of the Kovel doctrine, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court demonstrated that although the court was perhaps willing to
extend the attorney client privilege to third-party consultants in its jurisdiction,
the scope would have to be narrowly focused.
However, not all state courts adhere to the narrow interpretation of the
Kovel doctrine as demonstrated in Comcast. For example, in Olson v.
Accessory Controls & Equipment Corp.,201 the Connecticut Supreme Court
protected a report made by a third-party environmental consulting firm.202 The
defendant owned a manufacturing plant that produced hazardous waste
material, and after receiving an order from the State Department of
Environmental Protection (Department), the defendant retained an attorney.203
The attorney then hired an environmental consulting firm to assist the
counsel in responding to an order issued by the Department
204
concer
In determining whether the attorney client privilege applied to the
200
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199. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1198.
200. Id.
201. 757 A.2d 14 (Conn. 2000).
202. Id. at 17, 21.
203. Id. at 18 19.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 24 25.
206. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1994);
In re Grand Jury Matter, 147 F.R.D. 82, 86 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
207. Olson, 757 A.2d at 25.
208. Id. at 26 28.
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cases205 where federal courts determined that the privilege did not apply to
factual data compiled by environmental consultants.206 However, the
Connecticut Supreme Court refused to adopt a narrow interpretation, finding
was not applicable.207 Rather, the court partly relied on
an engagement letter between the environmental consulting firm and the
attorney as well as the conduct between them to determine that the privilege
applied.208 The court found that the sole purpose of the communication and the
report was to assist the attorney in providing legal advice regarding the
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209
Department
Therefore, while some state courts have adopted a
narrow interpretation of the Kovel doctrine, there are other courts that will not
immediately draw the narrowest application possible, but rather will apply a
broader scope of the Kovel doctrine, if it is consistent with the facts present.

B. Wisconsin, the Attorney–Client Privilege, and the Kovel Doctrine
Although many state courts have considered the issue of whether the
presence of a third-party consultant waives the attorney client privilege,
complexity in the modern business practices210 and the fact that Wisconsin is
home to multiple Fortune 500 companies,211 business organiz
to hire third-party consultants are not likely to decrease. Wisconsin courts
should thus adopt the Kovel doctrine in a way that is still consistent with these
icies underlying the privilege.
Codified in 1878, the attorney client privilege has deep roots in
212
The privilege can be traced to early Wisconsin
213
common law,

could potentially hire 13,000 workers. Kelvin Chan, What is Foxconn? Only the World’s No. 1
Contract
Electronics
Maker,
CHI.
TRIB.
(July
27,
2017,
7:37
AM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-what-is-foxconn-20170727-story.html
[https://perma.cc/YLY7-U2X8]; Patrick Marley and Jason Stein, Foxconn Announces $10 Billion
Investment in Wisconsin and up to 13,000 Jobs, J. SENTINEL, (July 26, 2017, 10:38 AM),
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/2017/07/26/scott-walker-heads-d-c-trump-prepares-wisconsinfoxconn-announcement/512077001/ [https://perma.cc/2DTZ-S75C].
212. See Harney B. Stover & Mary Pat Koesterer, Attorney–Client Privilege in Wisconsin, 59
MARQ. L. REV
allowed to disclose a communication made by his client to him, or his advice given thereon in the
Id. (quoting REV. WIS. STAT. § 4076 (1878)).
213. See, e.g.,
It is essential
to the ends of justice that clients should be safe in confiding to their counsel the most secret facts, and
to receive advice and advocacy in the light thereof without peril of publicity. Disclosures made to this
end should be as secret and inviolable as if the facts had remained in the knowledge of the client
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209. Id. at 26 27.
210. See supra Part I and accompanying notes.
211. According to Fortune Magazine, Wisconsin has
500 list. Molly Dill, Wisconsin Has 9 Companies on 2018 Fortune 500 List, BIZTIMES (May 21, 2018,
12:10
PM),
https://www.biztimes.com/2018/industries/energy-environment/wisconsin-has-9companies-on-2018-fortune-500-list/ [https://perma.cc/V4HD-L2ER]. In addition, Foxconn, the
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215
of Professional Conduct,214
216
current statutory scheme.
Wisconsin courts have laid out the policy underlying the attorney client
217

Similar to
upholds the attorney client privilege as a rule that encourages clients to
218
Although
the privilege may conceal relevant information, courts justify the rule by stating
that the attorney client privilege will typically lead to better representation and
a better resolution of the issue.219 For example, in State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit
Court for Milwaukee Cty.,220 the Wisconsin Supreme Court articulated that
[i]t is better to have otherwise concealed facts within the
knowledge of the person charged with the direction of the
lawsuit, even though he must not reveal the communication,
than to have those facts or opinions buried within the
knowledge of the client . . . . Although the communication
may not be revealed unless the client so wishes, the result of
the privilege is a more informed resolution of controversy, at
least in the aggregate number of cases.221
Consequently, applying the privilege, in the aggregate, leads to a better
resolution of the matter. In addition to that underlying policy, Wisconsin courts
have also typically held that the scope of the privilege should be strictly
confined and narrowly a

216. WIS. STAT. § 905.03 (2015 2016).
217. State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 578, 150 N.W.2d 387, 398 (1967).
218. Id.; see also Lane v. Sharp Packaging Sys., 2002 WI 28, ¶ 21, 251 Wis. 2d 68, 640 N.W.2d

219. See Dudek, 34 Wis. 2d at 578; Jacobi v. Podevels, 23 Wis. 2d 152, 157, 127 N.W.2d 73, 76
(1964)
recognition of the value of legal advice and assistance based upon full information of the facts and the
corollary that full disclosure to counsel will often be unlikely if there is fear that others will be able to

01/29/2019 13:38:24

220. 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N.W.2d 387 (1967).
221. Id. at 578.
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A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation
of a client unless the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized
in order
215. WIS. SCR
I will maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets of my
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222
223

Therefore, the policy
justifications underlying the attorney client privilege doctrine in Wisconsin are
very similar to the typical justifications other courts and experts rely on.
client privilege is codified in the Wisconsin
Rules of Evidence in § 905.03. Section 905.03(2) states in part that [a] client
has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from
disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the
rendition of professional legal services to the client: between the client or the
representative . . . 224
if [the communication was] not intended to be disclosed to third
persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition
of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the
225
Finally, in order to be a representative
one [must be] employed to assist the lawyer in the rendition of
226
Therefore, the combination of the policy
justifications as well as the codified attorney client privilege statute help define
an understanding of the application of the privilege in Wisconsin.
C. Wisconsin’s Adoption of the Kovel Doctrine
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Jacobi, 23 Wis. 2d at 157 (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2291, at 554).
Dudek, 34 Wis. 2d at 581; see also discussion supra Section II.A.
WIS. STAT. § 905.03(2) (2015 2016).
Id. § 905.03(1)(d).
Id. § 905.03(1)(c).
Id. § 905.03; Dudek, 34 Wis. 2d at 578 80.
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Based on its statutory provision and the policy justifications underlying the
attorney client privilege doctrine,227 Wisconsin courts should adopt the Kovel
doctrine. However, the scope of the Kovel doctrine should be limited to some
extent. In making this determination, this Comment will first examine the
statute itself to assess how the Kovel
attorney client privilege and then turn to what scope the courts should apply.
Specifically, Wisconsin courts should adopt an interpretation of the Kovel
doctrine that is not too stringent as to render the application of the privilege
impossible.
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Client

The definition of the attorney client privilege is very relevant in
determining whether Wisconsin courts should adopt the Kovel doctrine and, if
client privilege is
codified, a court would first need to ensure that the Kovel doctrine is consistent
with the statute. Arguably, the Kovel doctrine fits well within Section 905.03(2)
if a Wisconsin court determines that the thirdrepresentative. Indeed, if a court determines that an attorney hired a third-party
assist the lawyer in the rendition of professional legal
228
it would very much so emulate the rationale in Kovel for extending
the attorney client privilege to the accountant. While one could argue that a
thirdhired for her expertise and knowledge, as demonstrated earlier, courts have
indeed found that the third-party consultants can provide information that
assists attorneys in providing legal services.229 A third-party consultant could
thus become a representative of the attorney and prevent the privilege from
being waived.
The definition of confidential also supports the assertion that the privilege
s representative, third-party
would not be waived.230
in furtherance of the rendition of

2. Proper Scope of the Kovel Doctrine in Wisconsin
Although a court could, under the right circumstances, determine that the
Kovel
client privilege, the
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Y K

01/29/2019 13:38:24

228. WIS. STAT. § 905.03(1)(c).
229. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 330 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (holding that attorneys would not be able to perform their basic duties to their clients if they
could not discuss legal strategy with public relations consultants).
230. WIS. STAT. § 905.03(1)(d).
231. Id. § 905.03(1)(d).
232. See supra Part I and accompanying notes.
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legal advice.231 As stated previously, the growth of third parties consulting with
businesses will make attorneys more prone to communicating with consultants
for the furtherance of legal advice.232 Consequently, any communication made
in the presence of third parties would still be confidential. Therefore,
statutorily, a Wisconsin court could determine that the Kovel doctrine is
consistent with its codified attorney client privilege.
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court would still need to determine the proper scope of the privilege. Because
there is no consensus in both state and federal courts on the proper scope of the
Kovel
client privilege
purpose of the attorney client privilege is to encourage clients to communicate
with attorneys for the rendering of accurate legal advice.233 Given the rise of
corporations outsourcing more and utilizing third-party consultants for legal
advice, not adopting the Kovel doctrine or adopting it extremely narrowly, such
as by utilizing all three narrow factors,234 would likely limit the ability of
attorneys to give confidential legal advice. For example, adopting all three
factors would likely create a rigid and narrow interpretation of the attorney
client privilege that would apply in very limited, if any, situations. This would
render the purpose of the Kovel doctrine and the privilege itself useless.
Applying a strict construction of the Kovel doctrine defeats the rationale of the
attorney client privilege and fails to adequately balance the need for privileged
However,
applying the broad interpretation standard of merely helping or facilitating legal
advice would likely have negative effects on the litigation and truth finding
process, as it may overextend the application of the privilege.235
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233. See supra Section II.A and accompanying notes.
234. See supra Section III.B and accompanying notes.
235. See supra Section III.C and accompanying notes.
236. See supra Section III.B and accompanying notes for an explanation of the narrow
interpretations of the Kovel doctrine.
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attorney client privilege and the illustrative federal and state Kovel cases,
Wisconsin courts should adopt the Kovel doctrine in a manner more lenient than
the most stringent interpretation, but stricter than the broad interpretation of the
doctrine. Specifically, Wisconsin should adopt a narrow approach that does not
take into account all three factors, but rather only considers the two factors of
providing sufficient contemporaneous evidence and translating client only
information.236 Examining these two factors will enable a court to effectively
determine whether the third-party consultant is truly assisting an attorney in
providing legal advice as well as provide some predictability.
For the first factor, analyzing whether there is sufficient evidence enables
the courts to determine if the purpose of the privilege was met. Providing
sufficient evidence to the court, such as an engagement letter or demonstrating
specific hiring and billing patterns, illustrates that the purpose of hiring the
third-party consultant was to provide legal advice. Although it could be argued
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that advocating for an approach that considers contemporaneous documentation
may undercut the specific substance and relationship of the attorney, client, and
third party, Wisconsin courts should consider the contemporaneous evidence in
addition to the substantive information rather than as a substitute.237 By
utilizing this factor, the courts could provide some predictability for attorneys
using third-party consultants. Specifically, attorneys can strengthen the
likelihood that communications with a third-party consultant are privileged by
creating an engagement letter or performing some of the actions described
earlier.238 Although it likely is not completely necessary that a party have
contemporaneous evidence to prove that the Kovel doctrine should apply, such
documentation can be both helpful and instructive in determining its
applicability.
In addition to applying the first factor, Wisconsin courts should also adopt
an approach that considers whether the third-party consultant translated client
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237. For example, in United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1500 (2d Cir. 1995), the court
found that the privilege did not exist because the attorney failed to provide sufficient substantive
evidence as well as contemporaneous evidence to support the privilege. This case demonstrates a way
that courts have decided whether the privilege applies with the help or lack of contemporaneous
documents or attorney actions.
238. See supra Section III.B.1 and accompanying notes.
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determination of encouraging clients to communicate freely to attorneys. By
examining whether third-party consultants use their own information, rather
than the c
courts can ensure that the privilege is not too broadly applied or prevents the
truth-finding process. In addition, companies and attorneys can consider before
hiring a consultant what information that third-party consultant would be using,
which can potentially offer more predictability in this area.
Therefore, Wisconsin courts should utilize a narrow but lenient approach in
adopting the Kovel doctrine by only considering two factors when deciding if
the attorney client privilege applies to communications between an attorney,
client, and third-party consultants
common law and policy justifications of applying the privilege narrowly, as
well as with the reality that businesses are going to increasingly rely on thirdparty consultants in the facilitation of legal advice due to the complexities of
modern business practices. With that being said, as the court stated in Dudek,
tion is made and the precise nature of the
information sought is disclosed it is impossible for the court, upon whom the

40986 mqt_102-2 Sheet No. 171 Side A

01/29/2019 13:38:24

LOPEZ - MULR VOL. 102, NO. 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

1/29/2019 10:15 AM

ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE KOVEL DOCTRINE

641

attorney client privilege will apply.239 Therefore, although Wisconsin courts
should adopt a narrow, but lenient approach, to the Kovel doctrine, such
application will greatly depend on the facts and circumstances surrounding the
cations are shared with a
third-party consultant for the purposes of rendering legal advice.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the attorney
240

it is a vital part
of the legal profession. Without the privilege, communications between clients
and attorneys would cease to operate in the same manner and would irrevocably
241
Given the
rise in businesses reorganizing and outsourcing to consultants, the legal
business model is also shifting.242 To give proper legal advice, attorneys will
increasingly need to engage in confidential communications with third-party
consultants. While the Kovel doctrine allows communication between
attorneys, clients, and third-party consultants to be protected if the
communication is necessary or helpful in the rendering of legal advice, there is
no consensus among both the federal and state courts as to the proper scope of
the doctrine. This unpredictability and lack of clarity provides uncertainty as
to whether vital communications with third-party consultants are covered under
the attorney client privilege. With the rise of third-party consultants, courts
need to address this issue when it is presented in order to provide as much
clarity as possible.
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State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 582, 150 N.W.2d 387, 400 (1967).
United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989).
See supra Part II and accompanying notes.
See supra Part I and accompanying notes.
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underlying the attorney client privilege, Wisconsin courts should adopt the
Kovel doctrine, if presented with the opportunity. Such a decision would be
wise given the increasing use of communicating with consultants among
businesses and the Kovel
attorney client privilege. In terms of scope, Wisconsin should adopt a
moderately narrow approach that takes into consideration the contemporaneous
evidence presented as well as whether only client information was translated.
This will ensure that the approach is not too stringent that the privilege rarely
applies but for in a few circumstances but also one that is not too broad that it
disrupts the ability of society to gather evidence and generate the truth. While
such an adoption will likely need to wait until the facts are before the court,
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given the increase in the use of such third-party professional consultants, the
day that the Wisconsin Courts confront and address this issue is likely in the
not too distant future.

YAMILETT LOPEZ
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